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Ethics of Cadaveric Organ Procurement and Allocation (II)
Discussion summary: B. Michałowicz
Moderator: B. Michałowicz
Panelists: Rev. K. Szczygieł, M. Safjan, A. Rzeplin´ski, W. Land, A. Norton de Matos,
Sister B. Chyrowicz, Rev. W. Bołoz, A. Yussim, and M. Wichrowski
THE FIRST TOPIC discussed by the panelists wascollaboration between ethicists and medical profes-
sionals to elaborate a system of ethical assessment related
to all transplantation activities. The necessity of such a
system was agreed to be undisputable. Mutual consultation
requires a common language, fully understandable by both
parties. One of the panelists, an ethicist with a good medical
background, reported the reactions of students who listened
to his lecture on ethical aspects of new achievements of
medicine. Medical students regarded the medical issues as
evident, but could not follow the ethical comments by the
lecturer. Philosophy students fully understood the ethical
comments, but could not follow the lecturer’s discussion of
the medical problems. The disputants agreed that bioethi-
cists as well as medical professionals must increase their
knowledge of the others’ discipline and professional lan-
guage. Teaching of ethics must play an important role in
medical education.
Issues related to paid organ donation and organ com-
merce were the next topic. Generally, all panelists consid-
ered all forms of organ sale to be unacceptable. The
ethicists pointed out that the dead human body has a
unique character; it is no longer a human being, but it was
occupied by the whole of someone’s life. The body itself (as
well as its particular organs) is not anyone’s property,
neither the living “owner’s” nor the deceased person’s
family. Therefore, from a purely ethical point of view, it
cannot become an object of any commercial transaction. A
living healthy person may donate an organ as an act of love
toward a sick peron. The family of a deceased person
accepting the decision of transplanting his or her organs,
gives evidence of their generosity and compassion for those
whose lives can be saved by transplantation. Although a
poor man desperately selling his organ to save his hungry
children’s life is not to be blamed for such a decision,
replacement of humanitarian motives of donation by com-
mercial ones cannot be accepted.
Surgeons, speaking from their practical experience, pre-
sented the opinion that increasing organ procurement by
means of financial motivation to the deceased persons’
families or offering remuneration to living donors is wrong.
Instead of improving the situation, it might spoil the
transplantation enterprise. Development of paid organ
donation might, as it happened with blood donation, slow
down instead of accelerating advances in the program. The
adverse influence of organ harvesting on the physical and
psychological condition of “organ vendors” should not be
ignored. One panelist reported the results of questioning
the kidney vendors in Iran; the vast majority of kidney
vendors deeply regretted their decision to sell organs. They
had significantly lower scores on quality of life compared
with the controls. Medical ethics does not justify a donation
(with its associated health risk) to the donors without a
clear donor-recipient emotional relationship.
It is disputable as to whether incentives or reimburse-
ments for families of cadaveric donors (as recently pro-
posed in the United States) are a form of commercialization
or rather an act of justice in the case of people who have not
only lost their loved one, but also experienced certain
financial losses. It seems that some forms of financial
support may be considered acceptable as long as there is no
concealed corruption. The same applies to some reimburse-
ments offered by society to the living related donors.
Some panelists pointed out that, irrespective of our
beliefs and ethical judgements, paid organ donation is a
reality; in some countries it is legal, and in the others it is
functioning as a black market with all the negative aspects.
We have to face this fact without trying to ignore it in our
thinking and policy-making.
The next topic was the relation of the presumed consent
principle for cadaveric organ donation to human autonomy.
This principle, instituted by law, respects the free will of
every member of the society to refuse to be an organ donor
after death. From the ethical point of view it is questionable
whether the lack of refusal does really mean consent. The
trigger point in this discussion was the following questions:
are all people adequately informed about the possibilities of
expressing their refusal and are they aware of the conse-
quences of not expressing it? Should the answer be “yes,”
than there would be no moral objections. We know that it
is not the case; the information is far from sufficient. The
practical task for transplantation centers and institutions is
to intensify information and education in this matter, as
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well as to arrange a campaign that promotes consent for
cadaveric organ donation.
Although the law does not give the family of a deceased
person the right to make decisions concerning cadaveric
organ removal, the family’s attitude cannot be ignored. We
have to behave ethically in our contacts with them and do
not consider family protests as nonethical despite the loss of
a potential donor.
Finally, a stressful point was broached: do people who
oppose organ donation or are registered in the nondonor
registry have a right to an organ transplantation if they need
it? On the one hand, it would be immoral to refuse, but, on
the other, it is not fair to the other recipients. This dilemma
is one more argument in favor of encouraging people to
express the will to be a potential donor rather than to put
their names into a nondonor registry. The question of
whether somebody registered as a donor should have
priority as a recipient is difficult to answer. The American
position of placing a previous living kidney donor who
eventually requires transplantation at the very top of the
waiting list seems to fullfill the requirements of justice and
is praiseworthy from the ethical point of view.
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